



Return to Cold War in Europe?

Is this Ukraine crisis the end of a
Russia –EU Partnership?

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Structure of Relationship from 1991

- ▶ Partnership with new democratic Russia
- ▶ Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 1997
- ▶ EU's Common Strategy on Russia 1999
- ▶ Strategic Partnership
- ▶ Common Economic Space – 2001
- ▶ St. Petersburg Summit – 2003
- ▶ Four Common Spaces:-
- ▶ Freedom, Security, Justice
- ▶ External Security
- ▶ Research and Education

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- ▶ Road Maps
 - ▶ EU-Russia summits, Cooperation committees
 - ▶ Regional Dimensions:-
 - ▶ Northern Dimension -1997
 - ▶ Black Sea Synergy- 2007
 - ▶ Funding programmes:-
 - ▶ TACIS
 - ▶ European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
 - ▶ Key relationships - bilateral

Periodic Problems

- ▶ NATO bombing of Serbia - 1999
- ▶ Orange Revolution in Ukraine – 2004 – change Russian perception of EU
- ▶ Russo-Georgia War – 2008
- ▶ Eastern Partnership – 2009
- ▶ Problems with individual member states - UK

Reset 2010

- ▶ Partnership for Modernisation – 1st June
- ▶ Based on mutual interests
- ▶ Technical cooperation
- ▶ Move way from conditionality
- ▶ Medvedev – ‘special modernisation alliances with our main international partners’

Ukraine 2013/14 – End of Partnership?

- ▶ Kiev 'revolution'
 - ▶ Seizure of Crimea
 - ▶ Eastern Ukraine – rebel strongholds Donetsk, Luhansk backed by Russia
 - ▶ Western sanctions
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- ▶ Earlier 'partnership' period – fundamental long-term flaws
 - ▶ Need for 'partnership' with Russia still necessary (and inevitable) for EU, Russia and for the countries in-between – Ukraine, Moldova

Robert Gates – US Defence Secretary

- ▶ “When Russia was weak in the 1990s we did a poor job managing the relationship for the long-term”

Problems of Earlier 'Partnership'

- ▶ EU's 'external governance' approach to neighbours
- ▶ Conditionality
- ▶ Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
- ▶ Since 2000 – Russia rejects conditionality
- ▶ Different approaches:-
- ▶ EU- normative power – talks values - post-modern
- ▶ Russia – speaks interests

Values and Interests Gap

- ▶ Differences in priorities with neighbours:-
- ▶ EU priority – democratisation, rights
- ▶ Russia – stability, security, strengthening of state – since 1990s
- ▶ Differences in political philosophy:-
- ▶ Relationship between state and society
- ▶ Asymmetry of interests :-
- ▶ EU – opening of markets, transparency
- ▶ Russia – strong state input – energy, Gazprom

However


- ▶ Not overgeneralise differences
- ▶ Debate within EU and within member states on priorities, values, role of the state
- ▶ Debate within Russia:-
- ▶ westernisers, modernisers (?)
- ▶ statist

Security issue overlaid the relationship

- ▶ NATO enlargement to former soviet states
- ▶ Open to Ukraine, Georgia
- ▶ Eventually linked to EU enlargement
- ▶ Crises see return to bloc mentality
- ▶ Lack of pan-European security architecture


The Shared Neighbourhood

- ▶ Russia:-
- ▶ Self-perception as a 'great power'
- ▶ Strategic and security interest – Crimea naval base, Caucasus
- ▶ Prestige - loss of influence and parts of 'Russia' since 1991
- ▶ NATO and EU enlargement to former Soviet space

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- ▶ EU - Shared neighbourhood less significant
 - ▶ Lack of support post Orange Revolution
 - ▶ Limits of Eastern Partnership
 - ▶ Lack of support to Yanukovich prior to Association Agreement
 - ▶ No hope of EU membership
 - ▶ Underestimate the significance of “European” idea for Ukraine
 - ▶ Russia – offered concrete benefits
 - ▶ EU - underestimate importance of Ukraine to Russia – more than economics

Shift in Russian Self-identity since 1991

- ▶ Early 1990s – ‘westernisation’
- ▶ NATO enlargement, economic problems
- ▶ Mid-1990s – multi-vectored foreign policy
- ▶ Assert special status
- ▶ Early Putin – pragmatic nationalism
- ▶ Mutual pragmatic interest with West, no conditionality
- ▶ Great power Russia

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- ▶ Russia's right to defend interests of Russians elsewhere
 - ▶ West – source of technical help, not aspire to 'westernisation' of system,
 - ▶ Sovereign democracy
 - ▶ 2012 onwards:-
 - ▶ Russia – defend traditional European values
 - ▶ Conservatism
 - ▶ Suspicion of western-backed NGOs
 - ▶ 2014 – accelerate this
 - ▶ Putins's 18th March 2014 speech – lists humiliations of 18 years

Separate Russian Development and End of Partnership ?

- ▶ The Russian Idea
- ▶ Separate Russian model of modernisation?
- ▶ Traditional model
- ▶ Strong state as a vehicle for modernisation
- ▶ Self- sufficiency
- ▶ Putin's 'restorationist' model
- ▶ Re-orientation of interests – China
- ▶ Eurasian Economic Union January 2015

Big Problem

- ▶ Not a solution to Russia's needs for modernisation
- ▶ Good for catch-up
- ▶ Now – need diversification from raw materials economy, new technology, innovation, knowledge economy, inward investment
- ▶ Recognised by Putin and Medvedev from 2010
- ▶ Obstacles:-
- ▶ Corruption
- ▶ Lack of transparency in business
- ▶ World Bank – Doing Business Russia – 112th (Kazakhstan 49th)
- ▶ Arbitrariness of state

Contradictions of the System

- ▶ To maintain “great power”, stability of current system
- ▶ Need modernisation of economy
- ▶ Strengthening of state entrenched positions of those who be affected by reform
- ▶ Pressure on opposition, media further reduces accountability
- ▶ Conservatism, greater control discourages innovative intelligentsia
- ▶ Lack of impulse to efficiency
- ▶ Development occurs at cost of great resources

Russia's need for EU relationship

- ▶ Current sanctions exacerbate crisis
- ▶ Temporary (?) way out:-
- ▶ Maintain support via nationalism
- ▶ But still needs EU relationship
- ▶ 80% of oil exports
- ▶ 70% of gas – to EU
- ▶ Exports to EU – 40% of Russian state budget
- ▶ EU – largest direct investor – 25.5 billion Euros

2014 – Crisis also for EU

- ▶ Limits of ENP, Eastern Partnership
- ▶ Aim – democratisation, stability on EU's borders, ring of friends, greater integration with EU
- ▶ Belarus - ?
- ▶ Armenia – join Customs Union
- ▶ Azerbaijan - ?
- ▶ Georgia – Abkhazia, Ossetia -?
- ▶ Moldova – Transnistria, Russian trade embargo?
- ▶ Russia – lost?
- ▶ Further ENP – North Africa, Middle East – destabilisation, civil war, democracy?

EU – needs Russia Partnership

- ▶ Energy dependence on Russia
- ▶ 34% of gas imports
- ▶ 33% of crude oil
- ▶ More – with individual countries – Bulgaria, Lithuania, Poland
- ▶ Permanent instability on EU Eastern border
- ▶ “Failed state” in Ukraine have wider consequences
- ▶ Divisions open up within EU on Russia

Prospects of a renewed relationship?

- ▶ Obstacles -
- ▶ Crimea
- ▶ Status of and Russian military presence in Donetsk and Luhansk “Republics”
- ▶ Putin and relationship with EU
- ▶ Rhetoric on both sides
- ▶ Nationalism, anti-westernism in Russia

Positives?

- ▶ Russia not recognise independence of new republics
- ▶ Say - elections strengthen hand in relation with Kiev
- ▶ Stands by Minsk Accords (?)
- ▶ Have to subsidise them and Crimea
- ▶ Temporary energy deal Naftogaz and Gazprom – brokered by EU
- ▶ New EU foreign policy chief – Mogherini
- ▶ Lavrov to John Kerry willing to see US help in resolution

New Realism in EU-Russia Relations?

- ▶ A new realism in relations out of pain of Ukraine
- ▶ Putin :-
- ▶ End of Eurasian Union as a geo-political project with Ukraine
- ▶ Other former soviet states wary of Russian relationship, potential to use force
- ▶ Eurasian Economic Union – Russia not get own way
- ▶ Russian economic situation worsening
- ▶ EU :-
- ▶ End of 'external governance' model, EU as centre of ring of friends
- ▶ Instability on borders

Long-term Scenario

- ▶ A Common Space of Cooperation between EU and Eurasian Union
- ▶ Recognises – geo-strategic interests of Russia
- ▶ Recognises – geo-economic and geo-political position of states between
- ▶ Recognises – the asymmetry of priorities and interests with neighbours
- ▶ Benefit Russia and current elite
- ▶ Benefit EU – stability on borders and economic interests
- ▶ Benefit Neighbours in-between – avoid impossible choice between EU and Russia
- ▶ Present situation is a zero-zero game for all
- ▶ End to unipolar and bipolar approach to the area